[xxv] 这两种规则是美国联邦行政程序的规定,前者适用程序较严,要求有国会的授权,其效力等同于法律。后者一般不具有拘束法院的效力。但在实践中行政机关总是企图通过解释性规则或政策声明来达到与立法性规则同样的效果。在中国类似的情况更多。
[xxvi] See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239, 247-50(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)。
[xxvii] Id. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting)。
[xxviii] “old Skidmore as new Counter- Marbury”,这是个借喻,早期的Sunstein曾认为Chevron是反Marbury案的(see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Columbia Law Review 2071, 1990. ),also see Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations: A Post- Chevron Assessment, 22 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 411, 422(1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Exectutive Precedent, The Yale L. J. Vol. 101, 1992, p.993-98.
[xxix] 参见现行《宪法》、《立法法》及1981年6月10日第五届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十九次会议颁布的《关于加强法律解释工作的决议》的相关规定。
[xxx] 关于该观点可参见田雪梅:《关于完善我国行政立法的思考》,载,2004年11月4日访问。
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[2] Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 Duke Law Journal.
[3] John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 685, 691-692 (1999) (citation omitted)。
[4] Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein & Matthew L. Spitzer, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text and Cases, 5th ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc., 2002.
[5] Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law, 3rd edition, Little, Brown and Company, 1991.
[6] See Abner Greene, Checks and Balance in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 Uni. Of Chicago L. Rev. 123 ( 1994)。
[7] [英]W. Ivor. 詹丹斯。法与宪法[M].苏力。三联书店,1997.
[8] See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug?: Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,1998 Duke Law Journal 47.
[9] See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 453-54 (1989); also see Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post – Chevron Era, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283, 300-07(1986)。
[10] Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action- A Rivisionist History, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 200(1991)。
[11] Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro & Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process, 3rd edition, Foundation Press, 1999.
[12] See Stephen M. Lynch, Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 Duke L. J. 469 (1985)。